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UNITED STATES V. MONSANTO:

A "KINDER, GENTLER"

INTERPRETATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
FORFEITURE ACT OF 1984
I.

INTRODUCTION

As a result of government frustration with drug trafficking,' Congress
amended the penalty provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970 (the Drug Abuse Act) 2 with the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (the Forfeiture Act). 3 Prior to the Forfeiture Act amendment,
the Drug Abuse Act contained a section entitled "Continuing Criminal Enter1. See infra notes 210-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
of the Forfeiture Act.
2. Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 401412, 84 Stat. 1236, 1260-70 (1970) (current version at 21
U.S.C. §§ 841-852 (1988)).
3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 302-303, 98 Stat. 2040-51 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)). The Forfeiture Act amended the existing 21
U.S.C. § 848(a) and created 21 U.S.C. § 853. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(a), 853 (1988). The Forfeiture Act amendment to the Drug Abuse Act provided in pertinent part:
§ 853. Criminal forfeitures
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the
United States, irrespective of any provision of State law(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in
addition to any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in,
claims against, and property or contractual rights affording a source of control
over, the continuing criminal enterprise.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any other
sentence imposed pursuant to this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter, that
the person forfeit to the United States all property described in this subsection. In
lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or
other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or
other proceeds.
(b) Meaning of term "property"
Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in
land; and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges,
interests, claims, and securities.

(c) Third party transfers
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section
vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person
other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and
thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide
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prise," (CCE),4 which empowered the government to seize any property a de5

fendant obtained from violating its provisions upon the defendant's conviction.
The Forfeiture Act, however, provided the government with two new and powerful tools: (1) pre-trial restraining orders against a defendant's assets; and
(2) post-trial orders to reclaim specific assets that the defendant transferred to
third parties.6 Thus, the Forfeiture Act contained three distinct procedures that
the federal courts could use to seize all or part of a suspected drug trafficker's
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.
(e) Protective orders
(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining
order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take
any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of
this section for forfeiture under this section(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation
of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter for which criminal forfeiture
may be ordered under this section and alleging that the property with respect to
which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section; or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice
to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a
hearing, the court determines that(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail
on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the
property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or
otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the
entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against
whom the order is to be entered:
Provided,however, That an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be effective for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good cause
shown or unless an indictment or information described in subparagraph (A) has
been filed.
21 U.S.C. § 853.
4. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (1988)).
5. Id. Prior to the Forfeiture Act's amendment to the Drug Abuse Act, the forfeiture
provision of the Drug Abuse Act was contained in the CCE section. Id. The CCE section
stated:
(2) Any person who is convicted.., of engaging in continuing criminal enterprise
shall forfeit to the United States(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
(B) any interest in, claim against, or property or contractual rights of any kind
affording a source of influence over such enterprise.
21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982), amended by 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988).
Continuing criminal enterprise is defined as a "continuing series of violations of this subchapter... undertaken... in concert with five or more other persons... from which such
person obtains substantial income or resources." 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
The current version of the CCE forfeiture section states:
(a) Penalties; forfeitures
Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced
to... the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this chapter ....
21 U.S.C. § 848(a).
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), (e).
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property: (1) restraining orders at the pre-trial phase to preserve a defendant's
property for forfeiture;7 (2) court orders for forfeiture of a defendant's property
upon conviction;' and (3) special forfeiture verdicts designed to confiscate property the convicted defendant transferred to third parties (the "relation-back
provision"). 9
The Forfeiture Act sparked a debate among scholars, lawyers and circuit
courts.10 The debate centered on two issues: (1) if, upon conviction, a defendant faces possible forfeiture of assets, should a court have the power, at the pretrial stage, to restrain, or freeze, assets of the defendant that the defendant
wishes to use for attorneys' fees; and (2) if these assets are not restrained, and are
used by a defendant who is subsequently convicted, should a court have the
power to reclaim the attorneys' fees for the government under the relation-back
provision? Interpreting the statute affirmatively for both questions raises a sixth
amendment" issue. 2 If the statute is interpreted negatively for either of these
questions, then the Forfeiture Act amendment to the Drug Abuse Act is effectively superfluous and the Drug Abuse Act has the same impact as when Congress enacted it in 1970.
The United States Supreme Court decided these issues in United States v.
7. Id. § 853(e).
8. Id. § 853(a).

9. Id. § 853(c).
10. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
11. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
12. Forfeiture of attorneys' fees would make it difficult, if not impossible, for defendants to
secure a private attorney of their own choice. The sixth amendment of the Constitution guarantees that the accused "shall enjoy.., the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id. The
Supreme Court recognizes that the right was designed to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). The sixth amendment
secures an individual's right to the assistance of counsel, by appointment if necessary, in a trial
for any crime that is considered a felony. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 34445 (1963).
The sixth amendment also embraces the right to select and be represented by an attorney of
one's choice. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). However, a court may circumscribe the right when: (1) the advocate is not a member of the bar; (2) the attorney declines to represent the defendant; (3) a conflict of interest will arise if the attorney represents
the defendant; and (4) the defendant cannot afford the attorney. Id. at 159. Under the Forfeiture Act, courts would be circumventing the sixth amendment if they froze a defendant's assets
and then refused him counsel of his choice because he could not afford an attorney.
Besides this constitutional issue, there are practical ramifications of freezing a defendant's
assets allocated for attorneys' fees that deserve mention. First, many attorneys would hesitate
to take on drug cases if their fees were exposed to forfeiture. Indeed, since United States v.
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989), many criminal defense attorneys have refused to defend
persons accused of drug-related crimes or have left the criminal defense practice completely.
Fricker, DirtyMoney, 75 A.B.A. J. 60 (1989). Although public defenders are available to these
defendants once a court has rendered them indigent, it is doubtful that the federal public
defender's office could take on the additional burden of these complicated cases. Additionally,
a question arises as to whether taxpayers' monies should fund attorneys for these defendants
who are capable of providing their own representation. These issues are beyond the scope of
this Note but should be considered for a fuller analysis.
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Monsanto.13 In a five-to-four vote, 14 the Court held that the Forfeiture Act

clearly dictated, and Congress clearly intended, that: (1) pre-trial restraining
orders include any assets allocated for attorneys' fees; and (2) the relation-back
provision applies to reclaim any fees transferred from a convicted defendant to
his or her attorney. 5
Using the same case law and legislative history that was before the Monsanto Court, this Note demonstrates that the most defensible interpretation of
the Forfeiture Act is one which falls between a mandatory inclusion of attorneys' fees and a mandatory exception of attorneys' fees as forfeitable assets
16
under the Forfeiture Act. Given the permissive language of the Forfeiture Act
and Congress' purposes for enacting it, 17 the federal district courts should retain
their full equitable powers and be permitted to decide when attorneys' fees are
subject to pre-trial restraining orders or post-trial forfeitures. 18 This Note first
introduces the background of forfeiture statutes in general and the Forfeiture
Act in particular. Next, this Note sets forth the facts and the Supreme Court's
holding in Monsanto. Lastly, this Note analyzes the Court's opinion and suggests an alternative interpretation of the statute.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HistoricalBackground of Forfeiture Statutes
There are two types of forfeiture statutes: in rem' 9 and in personam.2 °
13. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). The Court also decided a companion case, Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). Caplin discussed primarily the constitutional issues surrounding the statute. Id.
14. Justice White authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2659. Justice Blackmun authored the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2667. The Monsanto dissenters were also the dissenters in Caplin;
thus the justices authored one dissenting opinion which covered the Forfeiture Act issues in
both cases. Id.
15. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662.
16. See infra notes 149-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the language in the
Forfeiture Act.
17. See infra notes 210-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative intent
behind the Forfeiture Act.
18. As Judge Winter noted, once a court exempts attorneys' fees from forfeiture, the court
should continue to supervise the defendant to ensure that the defendant is transferring reasonable fees to attorneys for legitimate legal work. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400,
1410 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Winter, J., concurring), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
19. A proceeding in rem is one taken against property, to dispose of the property, without
referring to the title of individual claimants. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL

PROCEDURE, § 3.8, at 114-15 (1985). Actions in rem do not impose personal liability but,
rather, affect the interests of persons in a specific thing or property. Id. § 3.8 at 115.
20. An in personam action is against a person or persons where the plaintiff seeks either a
money judgment from the defendant or a court order preventing/requiring action on the defendant's part. See id. § 3.2 at 97-98. An in personam action requires personal service of
process, but such service is not required for an in rem proceeding. Id.
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Both have long histories in American jurisprudence. As early as 1827, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the government's in rem seizure of property. 21 In rem actions against property form the base of civil forfeiture statutes.22 In these cases, the property used in committing a crime is considered
tainted. The property owner's guilt or innocence is irrelevant because, based on
a legal fiction, the property itself committed the wrong. 23 Under this premise,
the government's interest in the property vests at the time of the wrongful act
thus entitling the government to possession of the property.24
Federal drug enforcement statutes are enforceable against illegally obtained
property through this civil forfeiture process. 25 Civil forfeiture, based on in rem
principles, is widely used in the United States to confiscate virtually any type of
property that a defendant uses in a criminal enterprise.2 6
In contrast to civil forfeiture, criminal forfeiture is based on in personam
principles and serves a different purpose - to punish a convicted defendant.2 7
Criminal forfeiture has its roots in England.28 English law required a convicted
felon to forfeit to the crown all that he owned, not just the property used in
committing the crime. 29 However, criminal forfeiture never gained wide acceptance in the American colonies. 30 From 1790 to 1970, Congress authorized only
one criminal forfeiture statute: 31 the Confiscation Act of 1862.32 The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of this act on two separate occasions. 33
B.

Modern Developments

In 1970, Congress reintroduced criminal forfeiture into federal law. The
21. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
22. Id.
23. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974).
24. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1486 (10th Cir. 1988).
25. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988). The statute lists specific items that the United States
may seize including aircraft, money, securities and real property. Id.
26. Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 683; Hughes & O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal)Forfeiture and FederalDrug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern
Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 613, 618 (1984).
27. See supra note 20 for a discussion of in personam principles.
28. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1486.
29. Id. English forfeiture law is premised on the idea that all property is derived from
society, and a member of the community who violates the law forfeits his right to such property. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *299. Thus, the defendant's entire estate would be forfeited regardless of whether the property was involved in, or
derived from, the crime. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83.
30. Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 682-83.
31. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1487.
32. Pub. L. No. 37-113, 12 Stat. 589 (1862). This Act provided for the recovery of Confederate soldiers' life estates after the Civil War.
33. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 313-14 (1870); Bigelow v. Forest, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 339, 350 (1869). See Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO CriminalForfeiture
in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. L. REV. 225, 229-34 (1981) for a full discussion of criminal forfeiture
history.
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),34 and the Drug
Abuse Act35 provided specific measures aimed at controlling organized crime
and drug trafficking. RICO established a new offense for "acts of racketeering
activity."' 36 These acts included continuing offenses for gambling, securities
fraud and drug trafficking. 37 The Drug Abuse Act defined illegal substances and
prohibited activities involving such substances. 38 The Drug Abuse Act contained a section entitled "Continuing Criminal Enterprise" (CCE), which in
turn contained a penalty section. 39 Congress intended that the CCE section of
the Drug Abuse Act and RICO would control the distribution of illegal drugs
through implementation of harsh penalties. 4° Both RICO and the CCE section
contained new methods to combat the enormous profitability organized crime
and individuals gained from sales of illegal drugs. 4 1 One of these new methods
was criminal forfeiture. 42 Criminal forfeiture empowered the courts to4 3use in
rem proceedings to seize property and profits derived from illegal acts.
At first, criminal forfeiture seemed a promising means of reducing crime.
The Supreme Court stated that by "introducing forfeiture into federal criminal
law, Congress sought to dissuade individuals from pursuing criminal gain and to
eradicate the economic power bases making possible organized criminal and
drug related activities."'
The forfeiture provisions attempted to penalize and
deter criminal activity not merely by punishing convicted defendants, but also
by attacking the economic base of criminal enterprise.45 For example, the
RICO statute mandated the forfeiture of any "interest" obtained through racke34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
35. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1988).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). "Racketeering activity" is defined as "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene
matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law
and punishable by imprisonnent for more than one year," or any offenses under titles 11, 18
and 29 of the United States Code or under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting

Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
38. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841 (1988).
39. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a) (1988)).
40. Id. The possible penalties for a convicted defendant's violation of the statute were 10
years to life imprisonment, a penalty of up to $100,000 and forfeiture of profits obtained by
violating the CCE provision. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1982) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)
(1988)).
41. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941, 943 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1963, 1964 (1988)) (RICO criminal and civil penalties); Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat.
1265 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988)) (CCE criminal penalties).
42. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941, 943 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1988)) (RICO criminal forfeiture); Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988)) (CCE criminal forfeiture).
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963; 21 U.S.C. § 848; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text
for a discussion of in rem principles.
44. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
45. Id. at 26-29.
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teering conduct. 46 Congress believed the forfeiture provisions in both statutes
the ineffectiveness of the traditional penalties of imprisonment
would correct
47
and fines.
Despite Congress' intentions, illegal drug trafficking and organized crime
continued unabated and seemingly untouched by the new statutes. 48 Between
1970 and 1980, the United States Attorney General filed only ninety-eight CCE
and RICO cases and courts received only two million dollars in actual or potential forfeitable assets.49 During that same period, Congress estimated illegal
drug activity as generating sixty billion dollars in annual profits. 50
Congress held hearings in response to the statutes' deficiencies.5 1 Through
these hearings, Congress identified two major shortcomings in RICO and the
CCE section of the Drug Abuse Act: (1) the trial courts' inability to prevent
transfers of potentially forfeitable property to third parties; and (2) the difficulty
in recovering the property once transferred.5 2 Because both statutes required
the district courts to issue indictments listing the defendants' forfeitable property
before issuing the pre-trial restraining orders, the defendants could transfer, and
were transferring, assets prior to grand jury deliberations.5 3 Additionally, district courts could issue only mere contempt citations against defendants for
transferring listed property against the courts' orders.5 4 Therefore, the ineffectiveness of the statutes stemmed from both the absence of a procedure for preindicfment restraining orders and the lack of an adequate punishment for violaorders.5" As a result of these findings, Congress enacted the Fortions of such
56
feiture Act.
C. The Comprehensive ForfeitureAct of 1984
The Forfeiture Act affected the federal courts in four ways.5 7 First, the
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1988). "Interest" includes any proceeds produced by the illegal enterprise. Russello, 464 U.S. at 22. Procedurally, the jury in a criminal forfeiture trial
returns a special verdict declaring what interest or property is subject to forfeiture. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 31(e).

47. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 194-95 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3374, 3377-80.

48. Id.
49. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FoRFErruRE -

A SELDOM USED TOOL IN

COMBATrING DRUG TRAFFICKING 1, 10 (1981).

50. Id.
51. See Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1981-1982); Forfeitureof NarcoticsProceedings: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on CriminalJusticeof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
52. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, at 194-97.
53. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988).
54. Id.
55. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, at 194.

56. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 302-303, 323(a)-(f), 98 Stat. 2040, 2192-93 (1984) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)).
57. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
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Forfeiture Act subjected all federal drug felonies to criminal forfeiture,5 8 thus
increasing the number of crimes subject to forfeiture to an estimated twenty-five
percent of all criminal cases brought in federal courts.5 9 Second, the Forfeiture
Act expanded the definition of forfeitable property to include any property
"used, or intended to be used" in the commission of a drug offense. 6° Third, and
most importantly, provisions of the Forfeiture Act authorized courts to seize
time, courts could issue restraining
property prior to convictions. 61 For the first
62
orders before the filing of an indictment.
Specifically, the Forfeiture Act permitted courts to issue restraining orders
or injunctions at two different times: (1) concurrent with the filing of an indictment or information alleging the property is subject to forfeiture upon conviction; or (2) prior to filing the indictment if the court held a hearing for persons
with an interest in the property. 63 At either phase the court is required to determine that: (1) there is a "substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture;" 64 (2) the defendant may remove the property
and make it unavailable for forfeiture;65 and (3) the need to preserve the property outweighs the hardships placed on the restrained party. 66 Even if these
requirements are satisfied, however, and the court issues a restraining order,
the government files an
such an order is only effective for ninety days unless
67
indictment or shows good cause for an extension.
Furthermore, the Forfeiture Act permitted federal district courts to issue
pre-indictment temporary restraining orders without notice or the opportunity
for a hearing under special circumstances.6 8 In this situation, the government
must convince the court of two things: (1) there is probable cause to believe that
the property would be subject to forfeiture on conviction; and (2) notifying the
property owner would jeopardize the availability of the property.6 9 Such a temporary restraining order is effective for ten days unless the government shows
good cause for an extension. 70 The court may then hold a hearing to extend the
58. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988). Although the Forfeiture Act amendment to RICO and the Drug Abuse Act are virtually identical, this discussion
focuses specifically on the Drug Abuse Act provisions.
59. Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 26, at 626. See Reed, CriminalForfeiture Underthe
ComprehensiveForfeitureAct of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 747, 750-76
(1985) for an in-depth discussion of the changes the Forfeiture Act made to criminal forfeiture
law.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2).
61. Id. § 853(e).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 853(e)(1)(A), (B).
64. Id. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i).
65.

Id.

66. Id. § 853(e)(1)(B)(ii).
67. Id. § 853(e).
68. Id. § 853(e)(2).

69. I
70. Id.
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71
temporary restraining order.
The fourth affect of the Forfeiture Act on federal courts concerned its rela-

tion-back provision. 72 Under the Forfeiture Act, the United States' title to for73

feited property vested at the time the defendant committed an offense.
Therefore, any property transferred from the defendant to a third party, prior to
a conviction, could be subjected to a special verdict of forfeiture.7 4 Only by
establishing that he or she is a bona fide purchaser for value, without reasonable
cause to believe the property would be subject to forfeiture, could a third party
keep title to the property.75 Thus, this provision effectively voided defendants'
attempts to transfer assets to related parties and defeat the previous forfeiture
statutes.76
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Introduction

The Forfeiture Act 77 was silent as to whether "forfeitable assets" included a
defendant's attorneys' fees or whether an exemption existed for such fees. Those
who believed attorneys' fees were included as forfeitable assets argued that Congress intentionally omitted an exception for them. 78 Alternatively, proponents
for exempting attorneys' fees argued that the Forfeiture Act's silence, combined
with the detrimental effects of non-exemption for attorneys' fees,79 signified that
Congress intended an exception for such fees. 80 The circuit courts were split in
their interpretations of the Forfeiture Act. The Fourth, Seventh, Tenth and
71. Id.
72. Id. § 853(c).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that "the relation back provision
essentially borrows the concept of taint from civil forfeiture." Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1489.
76. See S. REP.No. 225, supra note 47, at 191, 200-01. See supra notes 34-47 for a discussion on forfeiture statutes existing prior to the Forfeiture Act.
77. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 302-303, 323(a)-(f), 98 Stat. 2040, 2192-93 (1984) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)).
78. Brickey, Attorneys' Fees Forfeitures: On Defining "What" and "When" and Distinguishing "Ought"from "Is," 36 EMORY L.J. 761, 764 (1987).
79. Judge Winter's opinion mentioned some of the detrimental effects of restraining a defendant's assets. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1408 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Winter, J., concurring), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). Judge Winter noted that preventing a
defendant from making ordinary lawful expenditures constituted punishment imposed before
conviction. Id. (Winter, J., concurring). "Because a pre-conviction restraint on ordinary lawful expenditures is punishment, hardship is inflicted on a defendant to the extent of the restraint." Id. (Winter, J., concurring). For example, the effects of a restraint render a
defendant indigent, thus making access to assets for food, medical care, or shelter impossible.
Id. (Winter, J., concurring).
80. Cloud, ForfeitingDefense Attorney's Fees: Applying an InstitutionalRole Model to Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 Wis. L. Rxv. 1, 6; Note, Forfeitureof Attorney's
Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce ofAttorneys" with the "Fruits
of the Crime?," 39 STAN. L. REV.663, 664 (1987).
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Eleventh Circuits held that the Forfeiture Act"1 reached all the defendant's
funds, including any funds allocated for attorneys' fees.82 However, the Second
and Fifth Circuits opposed such a view and exempted attorneys' fees from a
defendant's restrained assets.8 3
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court heard two companion cases to
decide the issue. In Caplin & Drysdale, Charteredv. United States,84 the Court
decided the constitutional concerns surrounding the forfeiture of attorneys'
fees. 8 5 In UnitedStates v. Monsanto,8 6 the Court examined the construction of
the Forfeiture Act and decided that: (1) the language of the Forfeiture Act does
not permit an exemption for attorneys' fees; and (2) Congress did not intend the
statute to have such an exemption. 7 This Note focuses exclusively on the statutory interpretation and exemption questions of the Forfeiture Act 88as presented
in Monsanto, but not the constitutional issues discussed in Caplin.
B.

Facts of Monsanto

In United States v. Monsanto,8 9 the Assistant United States Attorney indicted Peter Monsanto for violating RICO, the CCE section of the Drug Abuse
Act and various tax and firearm statutes. 90 The indictment requested forfeiture,
under the Forfeiture Act, of specific assets which Monsanto allegedly obtained
through illegal activities. 91 After unsealing the indictment, the district court
granted the government's ex parte motion to freeze Monsanto's assets pending
trial.92 Monsanto moved to vacate the order and use a portion of the assets for
his attorneys' fees.9 3 Monsanto also requested that the court not apply the rela81. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
82. See United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 641-42 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989);
United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 723 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Nichols,
841 F.2d 1485, 1491-96 (10th Cir. 1988).
83. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402; United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, 1333, (5th Cir.)
reh g granted, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988).
84. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
85. Id. at 2651. The Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment and due process
rights would not be violated by the Forfeiture Act if attorneys' fees were forfeited. Id. at 265657.
86. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
87. Id. at 2662.
88. Under the analysis of this Note, it is not necessary to address directly the constitutional issues because the statute is interpreted as avoiding such a conflict. See infra notes 189222 and accompanying text.
89. 109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989).
90. Id. at 2659-60.
91. Id. These assets were two parcels of real property valued at $335,000 and $30,000
each, and a bank account containing $35,000. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1401
(2d Cir. 1988) (en bane), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
92. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2660. The government made the motion pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 853. Id See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of
§ 853(e)(i)(A).
93. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2660.

November 1990]

COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITUREACT OF 1984

181

tion-back provision of section 853(c) to reclaim the fees if he was allowed to use
the assets to compensate his attorneys.94 In support of his motion, Monsanto
raised various statutory challenges to the restraining order and a sixth amendment claim that it denied him counsel of his choice. 95 The district court denied
96
the motion.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also denied Monsanto's
statutory and constitutional claims.97 However, the circuit court remanded the
case for a district court hearing so that the government could prove "the likelihood that the assets are forfeitable." 98 If the government failed to satisfy its
burden of proof, then the district court could exempt all of Monsanto's attorneys' fees from the forfeiture statute. 99 Nevertheless, the government met its
burden and the district court upheld the restraining order. 1°° The case went to
10 1
trial and a court-appointed attorney represented Monsanto.
During the time of the district court's hearing, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated its prior opinion and heard Monsanto's appeal en banc. l0 2 In
an eight-to-four decision, the en banc court held that the district court should
modify its order and permit Monsanto access to his assets for payment of attorneys' fees. l0 3 No dominant rationale prevailed in the en bane decision. Three
judges found that the order violated the sixth amendment,' ° 4 three judges questioned the order on statutory grounds, 0 5 and the remaining two judges supporting the decision questioned it under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.' 0 6 Because the Second Circuit's decision created a conflict among
the courts of appeals in interpreting the Forfeiture Act, the Supreme Court
10 7
granted certiorari.
94. I at 2660; see 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this provision.
95. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2660-61.

96. Id. at 2661.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citation omitted).

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Monsanto was convicted and the jury returned a special finding that the assets in
question were forfeitable beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2661 n.4. The Supreme Court
noted that this finding did not render the pre-trial restraining order moot. Id. The dispute
remained alive because the restraining order continued to be effective pending Monsanto's
appeal of his conviction. Id.
102. Monsanto, 109 S.CL at 2661. Monsanto's trial began after the court of appeals vacated its opinion and agreed to hear the case en banc. Id. at 2661 n.5. Four and a half months
into Monsanto's trial, the court of appeals rendered its decision in his favor. Id. The district
court offered Monsanto part of his assets to hire a private attorney. Id. Given the late stage of
his trial, however, Monsanto chose to remain with his court-appointed attorney. Id. The jury
returned a guilty verdict three weeks later. Id.
103. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402.
104. Id. at 1402; see U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
105. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1405 (Winter, J., concurring); see 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
106. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1411 (Winter, J.,
concurring); see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. 1112 (1989).
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THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

In United States v. Monsanto,'"' the Supreme Court examined the issue of

whether the Forfeiture Act amendment to the Drug Abuse Act required forfeiture of assets that a defendant designates for attorneys' fees.10 9 Justice White
began the majority opinion by examining the statute's language.1 10 The Court
acknowledged that the relevant provision of the Forfeiture Act stated that
"a[ny] person convicted of [a drug offense] 'shall forfeit.., any property' that
was derived from the commission of [the] offense[]." 11 Additionally, this same
section provided that "upon conviction a sentencing court 'shall order' forfeiture
of all property described in [section] 853(a)." '1 12 The Court stated, "Congress
could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be
mandatory. . . or broader words to define the scope of what was to be forfeited.", 113 Additionally, the Court emphasized that the "broad definition of
property [in the statute] included 'real property... tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities.' ,114
Based on this language, nothing in the statute "even hints" that assets marked
for attorneys' fees "are not 'property' within the statute's meaning." 115 The
Court concluded that "the language of [section] 853 is plain and unambiguous:
all assets falling within its scope are to be forfeited upon conviction, with no
exception existing for the assets used to pay attorney's fees - or anything else,
for that matter."11 6
After concluding that the statute, on its face, did not contain an exemption
for attorneys' fees, the Court examined Monsanto's arguments for creating a
judicial exception.1 17 Monsanto urged the Court to imply an exemption because: (1) the statute did not expressly include attorneys' fees as forfeitable property; and (2) Congress did not intend that it should reach attorneys' fees. 18 The
Court concluded that although the House and Senate debates were silent on the
19
issue, this silence did not support exempting attorneys' fees from the statute.'
The Court summarized its position by stating that the "congressional debates
are similarly silent on the use of forfeitable assets to pay stockbrokers' fees, laundry bills, or country club memberships; no one could credibly argue that, as a
result, assets to be used for these purposes
are similarly exempt from the stat120
ute's definition of forfeitable property."
108.
109.
110.
111.

109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
Id. at 2661-62; see 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2662.
Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988)).

112. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988)).

113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1988)).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 853.
117. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662.
118. Id.

119. Id. at 2662-63.
120. Id. at 2663.

November 1990]

COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE ACT OF 1984

183

While examining the legislative history of the Forfeiture Act, the Court
noted a House report which stated, "'Nothing in this section is intended to
interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Committee,
therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District Court opinions on the use of
restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a criminal
case.' ,121 Monsanto argued that this statement indicated Congress' intent not
to include attorneys' fees under the forfeiture provision. 122 The Supreme Court,
however, stated that this "ambiguous passage" could support the opposite interpretation as well. 123 Without giving any weight to the House report, the Court
within legal boundaries
concluded that the Forfeiture Act's plain language 1was
24
and was controlling on the issue of attorneys' fees.
The Court then addressed Monsanto's argument that certain prudential
doctrines for statutory exemptions, created by the Supreme Court, applied to
section 853(a). 125 In particular, Monsanto urged the Court to follow its own
12 6
The Court acdoctrine of construing statutes to avoid constitutional issues.
but inapplicauseful,
was
knowledged this argument and stated that this canon
127
is "'not a
canon
This
ble in cases where the statutory language is clear.
,,128 Bethe
legislature.'
by
license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted
853(a)
of
section
language
cause the Court had previously determined that the
on
based
was unambiguous, Monsanto's argument for creating an exemption
129
failed.
doctrine
this
Next, the Court considered the pre-trial forfeiture provision of section
853(e)(1)(A) 1 30 Here, Monsanto requested that the Court create an exemption
for attorneys' fees at the pre-trial stage. 131 The Court focused on Judge Winter's
1 32
separate opinion in the Second Circuit's en banc decision for its analysis.
The restraining order section of the Forfeiture Act 133 provided that a court
"may" enter a restraining order upon the filing of an indictment in order to
preserve the availability of a defendant's property for forfeiture. 134 Judge Winter interpreted the permissive language of this section as authorizing the district
121. Id. at 2663 n.8 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1
(1984)).

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2664.
Id.

126. Id.; see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
127. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)).

129. Id.
130. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988).
131. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
132. Id.; see United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1406 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane)
(Winter, J., concurring), rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989).
133. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988).

134. Id.
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courts to employ "traditional principles of equity" when deciding whether to
issue a restraining order. 3 5 Judge Winter held that the potential hardships on a
defendant weighed heavily against freezing any assets allocated for attorneys'
fees.1 3 6 Additionally, he concluded that payment of attorneys' fees from potential forfeitable assets was immune from the relation-back provision of section
835(c). 137 Thus, Judge Winter established that payments transferred to an attorney are free from forfeiture to the government
under the Forfeiture Act, even
38
if the defendant is subsequently convicted.1
The Supreme Court overturned Judge Winter's position. 13 9 The Court reasoned that section 853(a) of the Forfeiture Act is absolute; it contained no qualification that its reach could be limited by another section of the statute.140
Under section 853(e)(1), a district court "may" enter a restraining order at the
government's request, but it is not required to do so if posting a bond or an
alternate means of preserving the defendant's property is available. 141 Therefore, the Court reasoned that section 853(e)(1) implements section 853(a) and
cannot be read to give the district courts "discretion to permit the dissipation14of2
the very property that [section] 853(a) requires be forfeited upon conviction."
Additionally, the Court found that sections 853(e) and 853(a) were consistent,
thus, there
was no need to limit section 853 to assets exclusive of attorneys'
3
fees.

14

The Court continued its opinion by criticizing Judge Winter's interpretation of equitable discretion. 144 The Court concluded that Judge Winter's use of
equitable discretion was not discretionary at all because the judge had stated
that attorneys' fees must be excluded from restraining orders.' 4 5 The discretion
Judge Winter advocated for section 853(e) "becomes a command to use that
subsection (and [section] 853(c)) to frustrate the attainment of [section] 853(a)'s
ends."' 146 The Court explained its rationale by stating:
Whatever discretion Congress gave the district courts in [sections]
853(e) and 853(c), that discretion must be cabined by the purposes for
which Congress created it: "to preserve the availability of property...
for forfeiture." We cannot believe that Congress intended to permit
the effectiveness of the powerful "relation-back" provision of [section]
853(c), and the comprehensive "any property... any proceeds" language of [section] 853(a), to be nullified by any other construction of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1406 (Winter, J., concurring).
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
Id. at 2664-65; see 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
Id.
Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 853(a).
21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1).
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
Id.

144. Id.

145. Id.
146. Id.
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the statute.14 7
Although recognizing the severity of its decision, the Court believed that neither
intent in enacting it
the language of the Forfeiture Act nor the congressional
14 8
mandated exempting attorneys' fees from forfeiture.
V.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE MONSANTO COURT'S OPINION

Construingthe Language of Sections 853(e)(1)(A) and 853(c)
1. The language of the Forfeiture Act

At trial, Monsanto opposed an interpretation of section 853(e)(1)(A) which
would freeze all of his assets, without an exemption for his attorneys' fees, prior
to trial. 14 9 Monsanto also objected to the Court's application of section 853(c)
to reclaim any fees legitimately paid to his attorney if he was convicted of violating the Drug Abuse Act.15 0 Under its own precedent, the Supreme Court
should have concluded that both sections of the Forfeiture Act provide an exemption for attorneys' fees. Alternatively, the Court, at a minimum, should
the district courts to retain their equitable jurisdiction over the
have allowed
15 1
issue.
In previous cases, the Supreme Court has determined the scope of a statute
by first looking at its language. 152 The Court has proposed a general guideline:
"If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.' ,,153 Thus, clear language of a statute will control the statute's
meaning unless there is opposing legislative intent. The Court applied this test
in United States v. Monsanto 154 and concluded that section 853 is plain and
must forfeit to the government all
unambiguous on its face; therefore, Monsanto
155
his assets that fell within its scope.
This argument, however, contains a factual flaw. The Court based its opinion primarily on an interpretation of section 853(a). 156 That section reads,
7
"Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter ... shall forfeit .... ,,1
147. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), (c), (e).
148. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.

149. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1401 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S.
Ct. 2657 (1989).
150. Id. at 1401.
151. For an explanation of equitable jurisdiction, see infra note 169.
152. See, e-g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1980) (scope of criminal "enterprise" under RICO statute).
153. Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)); see also Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965).
154. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
155. Id. at 2664.
156. Id. at 2662 n.7.

157. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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Read in conjunction with section 853(b), 158 which defines forfeitable property in
broad terms, a defendant would have difficulty convincing a court that Congress
intended an exception for attorneys' fees upon conviction. Indeed, every court of
appeals, except for one, that has considered this issue agreed that the statute
clearly failed to exclude assets allocated for attorneys' fees from forfeiture at the
59
conviction stage.1
The basis of Monsanto's appeal, however, was not section 853(a) or section
853(b), but sections 853(e)(1)(A) and 853(c).' 60 These sections govern forfeiture
at the pre-trial phase or as a result of a third-party transfer.16 1 Both of these
sections contain the flexible and somewhat ambiguous term "may forfeit" in
their text. 162 The Court failed to apply its plain-language test to sections
853(e)(1)(A) and 853(c): the sections Monsanto was actually challenging. 163 If
the Court had done a plain-language analysis of these two sections, it would
have reached a different conclusion.
According to the Supreme Court, the first step when determining the scope
of a statute is to look at the statutory language.164 If the language is unambiguous, then it is conclusive.' 65 The text of section 853(e)(1) states, "Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction
.... ,166
"
Similarly, section 853(c) states, "All right, title, and interest in property.., vests in the United States upon the commission of the act.... Any such
property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant
may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture .... 167 If, as the Supreme
Court reasoned, forfeiture is clearly mandated at the conviction phase under
section 853(a) due to the words "shall forfeit," then the permissive language of
sections 853(e)(1)(A) and 853(c) mandate a discretionary review of forfeiture at
68
the pre-trial stage or when a defendant transfers property to a third party.'
158. Id. § 853(b). The statute defines property as "real property, including things growing
on, affixed to, and in land... tangible and intangible personal property, including rights,
privileges, interests, claims, and securities." Id.
159. See, eg., United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1989) (section 853
reaches all illegal funds including those earmarked for attorneys' fees); United States v. MoyaGomez, 860 F.2d 706, 731 (7th Cir. 1988) (no exception for attorneys' fees under section 853);
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1988) (attorneys' fees are not exempt
from criminal forfeiture under section 853). The Fifth Circuit does not agree with this interpretation, but it is currently reconsidering its ruling en banc. United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d
1332, 1333, (5th Cir.) reh'ggranted, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988) (property pledged for attorneys' fees is exempt from forfeiture under section 853).
160. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1401; see 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)-(c), (e)(1)(A).
161. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), (e)(1)(A).
162. See id.
163. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
164. Id. at 2662.
165. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
166. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (emphasis added).
167. Id. § 853(c).
168. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662.
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2. District courts' historical retention of equitable discretion
In addition to the plain-language analysis, federal common law favored permitting district courts to retain their full equitable powers.' 69 There is an established canon of statutory construction throughout the Supreme Court's opinions
that endorses a lower court's retention of discretionary power if there is no clear,
contrary legislative intent.170 Unless Congress "in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied." 17 ' This canon
first appeared in 1836 when the Court stated, "[T]he great principles of equity,
securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction." 17 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has admonished federal courts for
dispensing with the "requirements of equity practice" and their "background of
several hundred years of history."' 173 This is "history of which Congress is assuredly well aware."' 17 4
In 1944, the Supreme Court extended this rationale to include a situation
where Congress used the mandatory "shall" language in a statute. In Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 175 the Supreme Court held that when Congress uses the word "shall"
instead of "may," the federal courts are still required to exercise equitable discretion176 In Hecht, the Court construed a portion of the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942.177 A section of that act provided that, in certain circumstances, "a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order
shall be granted without bond."' 178 The defendant in Hecht argued that the
mandatory character of this section was clear from1 79its language, therefore, the
trial court was required to issue one of the orders.
The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that "shall be granted" is
169. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). Equity is generally defined as
justice administered according to fairness as opposed to justice administered through the
strictly formulated rules of common law. Gilles v. Department of Human Resources Dev., 11
Cal. 3d 313, 322 n.10, 521 P.2d 110, 116 n.10, 113 Cal. Rptr. 374, 380 n.10 (1958). Originating in England, it is based on a system of rules and principles aimed at doing what is fair in a
particular situation. Id. One sought relief under this system in a court of equity (also called
courts of chancery) rather than a court of law. Id. The term equity is equated with the spirit
of fairness, justness, and right which regulates the relationships in society. Id. Currently,
federal courts and most state courts administer equitable and legal rights in the same court.
Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
170. Porter,328 U.S. at 398.
171. Id.
172. Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 496, 503 (1836).
173. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
174. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982).
175. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
176. Id. at 328.
177. Id. at 321-22; see Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat.
23 (1942).
178. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 326.
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"less mandatory than a literal reading might suggest." 180 As the Court stated:
We are dealing here with the requirements of equity practice with a
background of several hundred years of history. Only the other day
we stated that 'An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which guides
the determinations of courts of equity.'... The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished it ....[We do not believe that
such a major departure from that long tradition as is here proposed
should be lightly implied.1 8 1
Summing up its position in strong language, the Hecht Court stated, "[W]e cannot but think that if Congress had intended to make such a drastic departure
from the traditions of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose
would have been made."' 182 Therefore, unless Congress explicitly stated, or
obviously implied, that a court's equitable discretion yields to a statute, a federal
court retains its full powers of equitable discretion. Not only does the Supreme
Court in Monsanto ignore Hecht and its progeny, but it effectively overruled
these cases by strictly construing the Forfeiture Act, which mandated equitable
relief, as being a statute that removed equitable relief from the federal courts'
jurisdiction.
In addition to neglecting the above analysis in its opinion, the Monsanto
Court fell into the same trap it accused Judge Winter of setting in his Second
Circuit concurring opinion in United States v. Monsanto.'1 3 As noted above,
sections184853(e)(1)(A) and 853(c) of the Forfeiture Act both contained the word
"may.,
Judge Winter, using the court's equitable jurisdiction, balanced the
hardships faced by a defendant, when a court restrains his property, against the
government's interest in ensuring the post-conviction availability of the property.' 8 5 Judge Winter concluded that: (1) the Forfeiture Act's language permitted the federal courts to exercise their equitable discretion to decide if a
defendant could use his assets for reasonable attorneys' fees; and (2) a court
should always permit a defendant to use their assets for reasonable expenditures
because the government has no countervailing interest in restraining the assets. 18 6 The Supreme Court stated that a federal court's equitable discretion
"turns out to be no discretion at all" because Judge Winter has predetermined
180. Id at 328.
181. Id. at 329-30,(quoting Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943)).
182. Id. at 329.
183. 852 F.2d 1400, 1405-11 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Winter, J.,
concurring), rev'd, 109 S.
Ct. 2657 (1989).
184. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), (e)(1)(A).
185. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1408 (Winter, J.,concurring). See supra note 79 for Judge
Winter's discussion of the hardships faced by a defendant rendered indigent by a restraining
order.
186. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1408 (Winter, J.,concurring).
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the outcome in every case.18s The Court eventually concluded that section 853,
in all circumstances, does8 8not exempt assets to be used for attorneys' fees from
its forfeiture provisions.
Ironically, the Court's holding that attorneys' fees must be included in a
pre-trial restraining order effectively removed all equitable discretion from the
federal courts in exactly the same manner that Judge Winter's holding stated
that the fees must be released. As a result, the Supreme Court has predetermined the outcome in every forfeiture case and, therefore, is guilty of the same
evil it detected in Judge Winter's analysis.
3.

The Supreme Court ignored its own doctrine that courts should construe
statutes to avoid constitutional issues

In the second half of the Monsanto opinion, the Supreme Court analyzed
whether a restraining order violated a defendant's right to counsel of choice as
protected by the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.18 9 There is, however, a long-standing principle espoused by the Supreme
Court which states that courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional
questions. 190 The Court has stated:
[W]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' 9 '
This principle was first stated by the Court in 1804.192
Thirteen months before the Monsanto opinion, the Court reiterated the importance of this doctrine in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building & Construction Trades Council.193 In DeBartolo, authored by Justice
White, the Court upheld an Eleventh Circuit decision which construed section
158(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 194 The Court held that
this section of the NLRA did not prevent a labor union from peacefully distributing handbills that urged a consumer boycott of certain stores. 195 The Court
acknowledged that construing the statute to prohibit such conduct would raise
serious first amendment issues. 196 To avoid interpreting the first amendment,
the Court stated that its duty was to "construe the statute to avoid such
187. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
188. Id. at 2665.
189. Id. at 2665-67; see U.S. CoNsT. amends. V; VI.
190. See, eg., Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929); Richmond Screw Anchor Co.
v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 (1928); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466, 471-72
(1926); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 (1924).
191. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
192. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
193. 108 S.Ct. 1392 (1988).
194. Id. at 1396; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1988).

195. DeBartolo, 108 S.Ct. at 1396.
196. Id. at 1397.
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problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 197 Thus, Congress must have clearly intended a specific construction of
a statute to raise constitutional issues before the Court will meet the constitutional challenge. Justice White stressed the importance of this principle when he
stated, "This cardinal principle... has for so long been applied by this Court
that it is beyond debate." 198 Justice White then cited seven cases in the text of
his opinion to emphasize his point.1 9 9 He also gave examples of two past cases,
with facts, to illustrate how the Court applied this principle in the past and
interpreted the NLRA to avoid constitutional conflicts. 2"° Justice White allocated two and one-half pages of the opinion, or roughly one-third of his analysis,
to emphasizing the Court's duty to interpret statutes following this timehonored principle.
A year later, Justice White's opinion in Monsanto dismissed the doctrine of
avoiding constitutional interpretations in one paragraph.20 1 Clearly admitting
that the Forfeiture Act presented a sixth amendment issue if courts restrained
assets allocated for attorneys' fees, Justice White ignored his own opinion in
DeBartoloand met the constitutional conflict head-on. 2 2 Citing DeBartolo,Justice White stated, "[W]e respect these canons, and they are quite often useful in
close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous.... Here, the language is
clear ....
23 This statement is flawed because Justice White mistakenly focused on section 853(a), which is the post-conviction section of the statute cast
in mandatory and precise terms of "shall forfeit," rather than section
853(e)(1)(A) which is the pre-conviction section cast in the permissive and ambiguous language of "may forfeit.",2 04 Justice White did not address the difference between the two sections and their different terms.
Additionally, Justice White's opinion in Monsanto had previously admitted
the existence of some ambiguity in the Forfeiture Act. His opinion examined a
footnote in a House report concerning the Forfeiture Act which explicitly mentioned attorneys' fees. 20 5 The footnote stated, "Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's sixth amendment right to counsel. The
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citing: NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932);
Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390
(1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 40708 (1909); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433, 488-49 (1830)).
200. DeBartolo, 108 S. Ct. at 1398 (citing NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); NLRB v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 362
U.S. 274 (1960)).
201. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
202. Id. at 2665. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice
White's opinion in DeBartolo.
203. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
204. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), (e)(1)(A).
205. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984).
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Committee, therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District Court opinions on
the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in
a criminal case.",20 6 The committee's disclaimer seemed to indicate a belief that
legitimate attorneys' fees should not be restrained under the statute.20 7 The
Supreme Court disagreed and said that "this ambiguous passage" could stand
for the opposite proposition since the House
expressly refrained from resolving
20 8
the conflict among the federal courts.
A better alternative to definitively deciding whether the statute does or does
not allow an exemption for attorneys' fees is available. The House report footnote referred to section 853(e)(1)(A), the pre-trial permissive language section of
the Forfeiture Act.20 9 The Court could have decided that district court judges
have equitable discretion to exempt attorneys' fees at the pre-trial stage. Additionally, the Court could have suggested some guidelines for when attorneys'
fees are exempt. Given the language of the statute and the judicial doctrine to
avoid constitutional issues when construing a statute, this interpretation satisfies
both areas.
B.

Congress' Intent Behind the Statute Also Supports a More Moderate
Interpretationof the ForfeitureAct than the Interpretation Offered
by the Monsanto Court

The discretionary language of section 853(e)(1)(A) of the Forfeiture Act
leads to some ambiguity in its interpretation. 2 10 If Justice White had followed
the principles detailed in DeBartolo,2 11 he could have interpreted the statute to
avoid a constitutional conflict but yet fulfill Congress' purposes in enacting it. A
close examination of the Act's legislative history shows that Justice White could
have reasonably allowed federal courts to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture
at their discretion. This interpretation would not have raised constitutional issues and is not "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 2 12
The dissenting opinion in Monsanto noted that the legislative history of the
Forfeiture Act is silent as to whether attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture
under the Forfeiture Act or if they are exempt. 2 13 There are, however, indications and reasonable inferences that exempting attorneys' fees from forfeiture
would be consistent with the purpose of the Forfeiture Act. It appears that
Congress enacted the Forfeiture Act for the specific purpose of preventing proceeds from criminal activity from re-entering and funding the cycle of illegal
activity. 2 14 For example, a Senate report explained:
206. Id.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662 n.8.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 845, supra note 205, at 19 n.1.
See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A).
See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
DeBartolo, 109 S. Ct. 1392, 1396 (1988).
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2667, 2668 (1989).
See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, at 191.
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Profit is the motivation for this criminal activity, and it is through economic power that it is sustained and grows. More than ten years ago,
the Congress recognized in its enactment of statutes specifically addressing organized crime and illegal drugs that the conviction of individual racketeers and drug dealers would be of only limited
effectiveness if the economic power bases of criminal organizations or
enterprises were left intact, and so included forfeiture authority
designed to strip these offenders and organizations of their economic
power.
Today, few in the Congress or the law enforcement community
fail to recognize that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant
violence, is plaguing the country. Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to
combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they
must include an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an attack may be
made.215
The above passage indicates that Congress' intent in enacting the statute
was to prevent illegally obtained money from funding future crimes. Money
transferred to attorneys for legitimate fees does not conflict with this purpose.
Unlike transfers of money to relatives or friends, which the defendant may subsequently recover, payment of legitimate attorneys' fees has a permanent, adverse economic impact on the defendant. Once paid to an attorney, the money is
kept by the attorney whether or not the defendant is convicted, thus keeping the
funds out of future criminal activity in the case of a convicted defendant.
The Monsanto Court examined the legislative history of the Forfeiture Act
but concluded that Congress' intent was to prevent a defendant's assets from
funding high-priced attorneys. 2 16 By concentrating on one section of a House
report, and taking it out of context, the Court concluded that Congress intended
to include attorneys' fees in forfeiture proceedings because defendants spent
large sums of money on hiring attorneys.2 17 The section of the House report
examined by the Court contained an example used to illustrate the government's
frustration under previous forfeiture laws. 2 18 The text of the example stated:
One highly publicized case.., is illustrative of the problem. That case
was United States v. Meinster .... In this prosecution ... a Florida
based criminal organization had.., grossed about $300 million over a
16-month period. The Federal Government completed a successful
prosecution in which the three primary defendants were convicted and
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id.
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662 n.8.
Id.
Id.
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this major drug operation was aborted. However, forfeiture was attempted on only two [residences] worth $750,000....

Of the $750,000 for the residences, $175,000 was returned to the
wife of one of the defendants, and $559,000 was used to pay the defendant's attorneys....
The Government wound up with $16,000.

It is against this background that the present Federal forfeiture
procedures are tested and found wanting.
The Court reponded to the excerpt by stating, "This passage suggests, at

the very least, congressional frustration with the diversion of large amounts of
assets to pay attorney's fees that would otherwise be subject to forfeiture. It
certainly does
not suggest an intent on Congress' part to exempt from forfeiture
2 19

such fees."
The full text of the House report presents a strong argument that Congress
was concerned with the general inability of the government, through previous
statutes, to capture the full amount of a particular defendant's assets (300 million dollars as opposed to 16 thousand dollars), and not with the general cost of
attorneys' fees. 2 20 The full text of the report stated:
One highly publicized case, although anecdotal, is illustrative of the
problem. That case was UnitedStates v. Meinster .... In this prosecution, commonly called the "Black Tuna" case, a Florida based criminal organization had imported over a million pounds of marijuana and
grossed about $300 million over a 16-month period. The Federal Government completed a successful prosecution... [however, forfeiture
was attempted on only two residences worth $750,000, an auto auction
business used as a "front" and five yachts.
Of the $750,000 for the residences, $175,000 was returned to the
wife of one of the defendants, and $559,000 was used to pay the defendant's attorneys. The auto auction business was worthless and the
five yachts were never found.
The Government wound up with $16,000.
This was an organization that lived in the "fast lane" of privately
owned jets, half million dollar yachts and $60,000 in restaurant bills.
Although there are many interrelatedreasonsfor the Government's lack
of success on the economic level, it is obvious thata considerableamount
of "proceeds" ofthis drug operation are elsewhere,probablyfundingfuture "Black Tunas."
It is against this background that present Federal forfeiture procedures are tested and found wanting ....22I
219. Id.
220. The attorneys' fees were approximately 0.2% of the assets in this case: $559 thousand
for attorneys' fees versus $300 million the organization was estimated as grossing. H.R. REP.
No. 845, 98th Cong., supra note 205, at 3.
221. I'd. (emphasis added).
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The report also contained a chart for the year 1979 showing that over fifty-four
billion dollars of narcotics income was retained by illegal distributors while the
Drug Enforcement Agency was able to seize only approximately thirty-three
million dollars -or about 0.06%- of the total income from illegal drug
2 22

activity.

One can properly characterize the House report's message as containing a
two-fold concern that: (1) the Government could effectively combat illegal drug
activity with stronger and more frequent use of forfeiture laws; and (2) the
money escaping forfeiture was funding future illegal activities. Nowhere does
Congress express a concern that attorneys' fees are intruding on the government's "take." As stated above, once a defendant transfers assets to an attorney,
the assets are permanently removed from the criminal activity cycle. An interpretation of the Forfeiture Act which exempts attorneys' fees is consistent with
the concerns voiced in the House report.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Forfeiture Act clearly gives the government the power to strip the accused of economic power gained from illegal activities once the accused is convicted. At the pre-conviction stage, the statute is ambiguous. The government
would certainly have an advantage at trial by weakening the ability of the accused to defend himself at this stage, but such behavior raises constitutional
issues. By seizing the assets at the pre-conviction stage and granting the trial
courts equitable powers to free those assets for legitimate attorneys' fees, the
purpose of the Forfeiture Act will be fulfilled. Furthermore, such an interpretation is more consistent with the Supreme Court's own principles concerning statutory construction, equitable powers of courts and Congress' intent in enacting
the Forfeiture Act than is the one offered in Monsanto.
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